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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jeffrey Alan Denny appeals from the district court's order denying his third
motion for credit for time served.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In July 2008, the state charged Denny with receiving or transferring a
stolen vehicle and possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.30-31.) These
charges were the result of an "attempt to locate" "out of Washington State." (R.,
p.16.)

Law enforcement located the vehicle "parked and running," with the

driver, later identified as Denny, leaving the car to use a "porta potty." (R., p.16.)
Denny had a "small baggy" and syringe in his pocket, "was difficult to talk too
[sic] and at times was hard to understand," but he admitted taking the vehicle.
(R., pp.16-17.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Denny pled guilty to possession of a
controlled substance and the state dismissed the remaining charge. (R., pp.4144, 46-48.) The court imposed a unified seven-year sentence with three years
fixed and retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.52-57.)

At the conclusion of the

jurisdictional review period, the court placed Denny on probation for three years.
(R., pp.62-66.)

On October 7, 2011, the state filed a Report of Probation Violation
alleging Dem1y violated his probation by committing the crime of felon in
possession of a firearm (which he was arrested for in Washington), failing to
complete community service, moving to Washington without permission, using
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methamphetamine, failing to pay court costs, and failing to pay restitution. (R.,
pp.85-88.) Because Denny was in custody in Washington when the Report of
Probation Violation was filed, and was not arrested on the bench warrant issued
pursuant to that report until December 7, 2012, the probation violation
allegations were not resolved until January 3, 2013.
132.)

(See R., pp.85-96, 127,

At that hearing, the state agreed to withdraw the first allegation (that

Denny unlawfully possessed a firearm) and Denny admitted the remaining
allegations.

(R., p.132.)

The court revoked Denny's probation and again

retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.134-136.) On April 25, 2013, at the conclusion of
the second review period, the court relinquished jurisdiction. (R., pp.140-141.)
Three months later, Denny filed a motion requesting credit for time served
along with a supporting affidavit. (R., pp.143-146.) In his affidavit, Denny asked
to receive credit for the "year" between his "original[ ] arrest[ ] in April of 2008"
and his "release[ ] on probation on or about April 13th, 2009."

(R., p.145.)

Denny also requested credit for time he was in the Spokane County Jail after the
October 7, 2011 Report of Probation Violation was filed. (R., p.146.) The court
granted Denny's motion to the extent it awarded credit for the following time
Denny spent in custody: ( 1) 143 days for time served between Denny's arrest on
June 20, 2008, and his release on probation on April 13, 2009, and (2) 136 days
for time served between Denny's December 7, 2012 arrest on the bench warrant
to imposition of sentence on April22, 2013. (R., p.148.)
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One month later, Denny filed a second motion for credit for time served
with another affidavit. (R., pp.150-153.) In this motion, Denny again requested
credit for the time he spent in the Spokane County Jail. (R., p.152.)
In response to Denny's second motion, the district court wrote a letter to
Denny, advising him:
No further credit for time served can be granted beyond the
order dated August 8, 2013. A person held in another jurisdiction
on a warrant from Kootenai County, Idaho, can be given credit for
that time only if the only document keeping that person in custody
is the Kootenai County warrant. The fourteen (14) months you
reference in your most recent motion and affidavit was time served
for another state's convictions for Possession of Stolen Property
and 2nd Degree Robbery (per your statement at the January 3,
2013, probation violation hearing). Thus, you cannot be given
credit for those fourteen (14) months toward your Idaho sentence.
(R., p.158.)

After receiving the court's letter, Denny filed another affidavit, stating:
On 10-3-11 I was arrested and held in Spokane County Jail
for 30 days on a probation violation for my Washington probation.
On 10-11-11 I was notified that Idaho issued a warrant for a
probation violation and was therefore unable to gain release
through bond or otherwise until I was transported to Kootenai
[County] on 12-7-12 despite the expiration of the 30 day sentence
imposed by Washington on or about 11-2-11. Pursuant to Idaho
Code 18-309 I am entitled to be credited about 13 months on the
charge Idaho violated me on.
On January 3, 2012 I made a statement at the probation
hearing ... during a state of mental confusion due to changes in
psychotropic medications I take that were made by the medical
staff at Kootenai County Jail after I was transported there from
Spokane County Jail. These statements were incorrect and should
not be used against me. I was only sentenced by Washington to
30 days on the convictions of possession of stolen property and 2nd
degree robbery and the warrant issued by Kootenai County made it
impossible for me to get out and kept me in custody for another 13
months past the Washington sentence. I therefore ask this matter
to be investigated and I be credited the remaining 13 months that I

3

was made to serve until I was transported to Kootenai County on
December 7, 2012.
(R., p.155 (capitalization altered).)
Along with his affidavit, Denny filed his third motion for credit for time
served. (R., p.159.) The court denied the motion. (R., p.161.) Denny filed a
notice of appeal timely only from the court's order denying his third motion for
credit for time served. (R., pp.174-178.)
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ISSUE
Denny states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Denny's third motion for
credit for time served?
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)

The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Denny failed to show the district court erred in denying his third
request for credit for time served?
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ARGUMENT
Denny Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Third Request For Credit
For Time Served

A.

Introduction
Denny challenges the denial of his third motion for credit for time served,

arguing that although he is "[m]indful of I.C. § 19-2603" he believes he is
nevertheless "entitled to be credited about 13 months." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.)
As implied by Denny's "mindful" argument, the law and the facts do not support
his claim of error.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit

for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is
subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67,
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763,
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The appellate courts "defer to the trial court's
findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial
and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous."
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing
State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 2003)).

C.

The Record Supports The District Court's Order Denying Denny's Third
Motion For Credit For Time Served
The award of credit for time served is governed by I.C. § 18-309, which

provides in relevant part:
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In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom
the judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for
any period of incarceration prior to the entry of judgment, if such
incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which
the judgment was entered. The remainder of the term commences
upon the pronouncement of the sentence ....
(Emphasis added).

The italicized phrase means that the right to credit is

conferred only if the prejudgment incarceration is a consequence of or
attributable to the charge or conduct for which the sentence is imposed. State v.
Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850, 865 P.2d 176, 177 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Hale, 116
Idaho 763, 765, 779 P.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. 1989).

Accordingly, when a

defendant seeks credit for prejudgment incarceration, "the applicable inquiry is
whether the incarceration was for the same offense or an included offense for
which the judgment was entered." State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 399, 179
P.3d 360, 362 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing I.C. § 18-309; State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho
67, 68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005)); see also I.C. § 20-209A ("A
person who is sentenced may receive credit toward service of his sentence for
time spent in physical custody pending trial or sentencing, or appeal, if that

detention was in connection with the offense for which the sentence was
imposed." (emphasis added)). "If a particular period of confinement served prior
to the imposition of sentence is not attributable to the charge or conduct for
which a sentence is to be imposed, the offender is not entitled to credit for such
confinement; neither does the sentencing judge err by denying credit under such
circumstances." State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 765, 779 P.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App.
1989) (citations omitted).
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Applying the plain language of I.C. § 18-309 to the facts of this case, the
district court correctly concluded Denny is not entitled to credit toward his Idaho
sentence for any time he spent in custody in the Spokane County Jail between
his October 3, 2011 Washington arrest for "nuisance" and unlawful possession of
a firearm (R., p.90), and his December 7, 2012 arrest on the Idaho bench
warrant. Denny's argument to the contrary is based on his assertion that he was
"notified that Idaho issued a warrant for a probation violation" on October 11 ,
2011, and his claim that "[t]he sentence for his Washington State probation
violation was only 30 days, and it expired on or about November 2, 2011 ," but,
because of the bench warrant, he was '"unable to gain release' until he was
transported to Kootenai County on December 7, 2012." (Appellant's Brief, pp.910.) Denny's arguments are without merit.
The start date for calculating Denny's credit for time served is the date of
his arrest on the Idaho bench warrant. State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 398,
179 P.3d 360, 361 (Ct. App. 2008) ("credit must be given for jail incarceration
after arrest for a probation violation") (emphasis omitted).

That date was

December 7, 2012, and the district court correctly based its calculation of credit
for time served using that date. (R., p.148.) Denny cites no legal authority to
support the proposition that he begins receiving credit for time served when he is
"notified" that a bench warrant exists. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.)
And, such a claim is contrary to existing law. McCarthy, supra.
Denny's argument that he would have been released from the Spokane
County Jail "on or about November 2, 2011 ," after serving "30 days" for his
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Washington probation violation, but for the existence of the Idaho bench warrant,
is contrary to the record and logic. The record shows that, on October 3, 2011,
Denny was placed in custody in Washington as a result of his arrest for
"nuisance" and unlawful possession of a firearm.

(R., pp.90-91, 108.) At the

time of his arrest, Denny was also on probation in Washington for possession of
a stolen vehicle and 2nd degree robbery.

(R., p.126; see Tr., p.12, Ls.17-20.)

While Denny may have been required to serve 30 days as a result of violating his
Washington probation due to his arrest on new charges, that was not the only
basis for his incarceration in Washington; he also had new criminal charges
pending. As his attorney noted at the January 3, 2013 disposition hearing, the
unlawful possession charge remained pending for "almost a year after he was
arrested on it," before Washington supposedly decided to dismiss it.

1

(Tr., p.16,

Ls.1 0-24.) Logic also dictates that Washington did not house Denny for a year
waiting for Idaho to get around to transporting him; and the record indicates that
was not the case. While Denny may think it is "unfair" that he was incarcerated
in Spokane on a charge that was eventually dismissed (Tr., p.16, Ls.21-24), that
is irrelevant to whether he is entitled to credit for time served in Idaho. He is only
entitled to credit from the date of his arrest on the bench warrant, and he
received all the credit he is due.

1

Although Denny complained about the district court's reliance on statements he
made at the January 3, 2013 hearing (R., p.155), he does not reiterate this
complaint on appeal, presumably because the district court did not need to rely
on Denny's statements in order to deny his request. The court only needed to
calculate the credit based on the date of Denny's arrest on the bench warrant,
which date is undisputed. (Appellant's Brief, p.5 n.3.)
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Because the district court correctly denied Denny's third motion for credit
for time served, Denny has failed to show any basis for reversal.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order denying Denny's third motion for credit for time served.
DATED this 21st day of July 2014.

odo

JE SICA M. LORELLO
Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of July 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
add res sed to:
BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

J~
DQAttorney General
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